Source: THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN DEVELOPMENT

Joy M. Moncrieffe Overseas Development Institute
Prepared for the Commission for Africa November 2004

SUMMARY: Culture is gradually gaining presence in development discourse, as policymakers acknowledge that the social and cultural norms that people observe influence their attitudes and choices and that people need not---and in many societies often do not---act autonomously. However, there is no consensus on what culture entails, how it matters or on the implications for policy. This paper contrasts static and more 'fluid' conceptualizations of culture and highlights how they influence policy approaches. It suggests that fixed definitions (such as where culture is depicted as in all cases irrational and inimical to development ) tend to overlook or underestimate the very important and myriad ways in which culture influences development . Conversely, while the 'fluid' view (which regards culture as 'dynamically interactive and developing') avoids the types of unhelpful generalisations that are often used to categorize, confine and discriminate against groups and individuals, an over-enthusiastic interpretation of the dynamism of culture can easily underestimate the role of power in shaping identities and culture and in restricting or facilitating the space and capacity to contest. The paper discusses how static and discriminatory views of African societies and cultures have obstructed constructive engagement. For example, African cultures have been characterised as regressive and tribal. While fears of tribalism and conflict are not entirely misplaced, this apprehension and the resulting evasion of ethnicity and culture preclude serious consideration of the root causes of such conflicts, which current studies variously attribute to factors such as horizontal (inter-group) inequalities, perceived and real, and to 'nation-state' policy approaches, which discount the existence and significance of diverse cultures in the bid to build common national identities. Analysts are now acknowledging that the more constructive approach is to understand the significance of culture in African societies, the roots to both the positive and negative perceptions and how cultural traditions influence forms of behaviour that can both support and undermine development . Accordingly, Section 3 of the paper provides a brief historical overview of the development and transition of ethnicity and culture in Africa , underlining some of the main causes of conflict. The section confirms that despite the transitions and corruption of ethnicity and culture, old and new cultures continue to influence development and are highly valued across African countries. Section 4 analyses policy issues, concentrating specifically on the importance of group rights and recognition, including the limitations of the group approach and the challenges to change; the ways in which a cultural approach to development can help policy makers understand and address the processes and power relations that underpin inequality and poverty; culture and its potential role in democracy and conflict; the role of cultural industries; and the significance of cultural knowledge and ownership. The section emphasizes that safeguards are needed for facilitating fluid and democratic associations and identities and for preventing the disadvantage of the most marginalized. The paper notes that a culture-sensitive approach to development can itself become deterministic if policymakers do not integrate culture with other factors that influence identities, such as class, occupation, gender, location and politics. It is the intermingling of all these sources of identity that produces heterogeneity, fluidity and change.

1. APPROACHES TO CULTURE: The classic rational choice framework that still underpins policy approaches in some key donor agencies has had a significant role in legitimising a-social and a- cultural views on development . The framework conceives individuals as autonomous actors who, with the appropriate combination of assets and opportunities, will exercise 'agency' and, thereby, improve their welfare. 'Agency' assumes that individuals 'possess internal powers and capacities, which, through their exercise, make them active entities, constantly intervening in the course of events around them' (Barnes, 2000). It follows that people are poor because they lack or have inadequate access to assets and opportunities. Poverty reduction policies should focus on supplying these and on improving the conditions under which people might exercise their agency. The opposing structural view argues that people are fundamentally social creatures and actors. As 'interdependent social agents', they expect mutual accountability---which involves mutual susceptibility---and develop standards and processes for approval and disapproval. Therefore, it is perfectly 'rational' for persons to act in ways that uphold shared ways of living and agreed understandings, even where these actions do not serve individual interests (See Barnes 2000, Chapter 5). Those who place structure over agency emphasize the ways in which 'social institutions and structures shape' behaviour (Eyben 2004:7). The more radical of these discount concepts such as agency, arguing that people are shaped by their history and by power structures and social forces that they cannot control. Between these extreme views, there is a range of moderate positions, which struggle to define the appropriate balance between structure and agency. For example, moderate social/relational approaches often do not refute the existence and role of individualism or the importance of assets and opportunities; however, they emphasize the need to understand the social and cultural contexts within which people operate and the ways in which these contexts influence and can influence development . Similarly, many contemporary economists now acknowledge that: i. People's identities can revolve around their ethnic and other social group, which confers (a) culturally specific practices and a unique set of symbols and (b) a sense of belonging that [helps to define their] interactions with both insiders and outsiders' (Mare, 1993:23). ii. The social and cultural norms that people observe influence their attitudes and choices. People need not---and in many societies often do not---act autonomously. Therefore, by ignoring or underestimating social/ cultural norms and values , policymakers can miss potentially fruitful entry points and/or overlook some of the potential blocks to the policies they recommend. Rather than reject traditions of kinship, society and culture, there is a growing group of economists who regard these as important to development . Further, they suggest that misperceptions of the significance and potential role of culture have resulted in partial and, in places, incompatible policies (Rao and Walton 2004). However, these 'middle-ground' views do not mean consensus. Recent literature still depicts the ongoing struggles between structure and agency. For example, Barnes (2000) rejects the importation of agency into social science discourse and seeks to reinforce the primacy of social action. Barnes' thesis supports the view that there are alternate development paths, which do not depend on individual agency. Conversely, while some economists have tempered their claims about agency, they also emphasize an action-oriented approach to culture and are concerned with identifying ways of encouraging the type of cultural change that will support agency and, thereby, economic development . Such differences in approach have very different implications for cultural policymaking and outcomes. 2. I NTERPRETATIONS OF C ULTURE Culture, therefo re, is now gaining presence in development discourse, though there is no consensus on what it entails, how it matters or on the implications for policy. Definitions, which tend to range from more 2

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static to fluid versions, are frequently used to corroborate political positions. There is a group of theorists who see culture as inherently destructive. These argue that culture is inimical to development : it is an irrational force that generates inertia and culminates in economic backwardness (cited in Douglas, 2004: 87). Here, analysts (see Huntington 2000; Landes 2000; Harrison 2000) differentiate between societies that observe traditional as opposed to modern cultures, concluding that 'societies steeped in traditional cultures are unsuited to market-oriented development and are, thus, fundamentally hampered in their pursuit of growth'. (Rao and Walton 2004:10) A similarly static view of culture informs the argument that Western societies actively promote a certain culture of development , which instils ideologies and policies that deepen inequalities across and within countries (Escobar, 1995; see discussion in Rao and Walton, 2004). As Rao and Walton contend, while there is some truth in both positions, they offer no space for change; they reject the position that culture is, in fact, 'dynamically interactive and developing' (Douglas, 2004:88). Therefore, such fixed definitions of culture tend to overlook or underestimate the very important and myriad ways in which culture influences development . In contrast to the static view, Rao and Walton (2004) interpret culture in terms of relationality; that is, 'the relationships among individuals within groups, among groups, and between ideas and perspectives (See Textbox 1.1). The dynamic/fluid view avoids the types of unhelpful generalisations that are often used to categorize, confine and discriminate against groups and individuals. Conversely, an over-enthusiastic interpretation of the dynamism of culture can easily underestimate the role of power in shaping identities and culture and in restricting or facilitating the space and capacity to contest. Bourdieu (1990) discusses the concept of habitus , which suggests that some social and cultural practices may be so ingrained that people accept and uphold arrangements and relations that perpetuate their own inequality and poverty. One frequently cited example are women who seem complicit in their subjugation and actively promote unequal gender relations that disfavour themselves and girls within their communities and homes. Therefore, balance is important for understanding the role of culture in different contexts, how policymakers can and should engage, the immediate and long-term prospects for change and the likely directions that change might take. Importantly, balance also requires the integration of culture with other factors that influence identities, such as class, occupation, gender, location and politics (Sen 2004). It is the intermingling of all these sources of identity that produces heterogeneity, fluidity and change. 2.1 Interpretations of African Cultures Static and discriminatory views of African societies and cultures have imposed various negative labels. For example, African cultures have been characterised as regressive and tribal. Cultural ascriptions are often personalised, as reflected in the argument that Africans are by nature 'tribalistic'; therefore, these tendencies pervade despite attempts at modernisation. Such statements suggest that Africans are irrational, and lay the blame for their poverty squarely on this inherent and inescapable trait (Vail 1996). Undoubtedly, fears of tribalism and conflict are not entirely misplaced. Identity wars, in places such as Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda, have flouted development plans and programmes and inflicted a costly and wasteful toll on human lives. Yet, this apprehension and resulting evasion of ethnicity and culture preclude serious consideration of the root causes of such conflicts, which current studies variously attribute to factors such as horizontal (inter-group) inequalities, perceived and real (Stewart 2002), and 'nation-state' policy approaches, which disc ount the existence and significance of diverse cultures in the bid to build common national identities (Linz, Stepan and Yadav, 2004). Analysts are now acknowledging that the more constructive approach is to understand the significance of culture in African societies, the roots to both the positive and negative perceptions and how cultural traditions influence forms of behaviour that can both support and undermine development . An improved social/relational understanding will help policymakers recognize and respond to both the opportunities and the blocks that culture presents. 3

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3. T HE D EVELOPMENT AND T RANSITION OF I DENTITIES IN A FRICA 3.1 Pre-colonial Africa In pre-colonial Africa , clans--- groups of people who share the same ancestor, either through birth or kinship---were the central units of administration in both segmentary and more centralised societies, though in the more sparsely populated areas, family relations took precedence. Clans had a variety of customary practices and social and political structures. Some of these customs were developed through consensus and/or commonly accepted principles of mutual accountability and susceptibility, such as between elders and non-elders and the wealthy and the poor. As Karugire (1980:13) describes in the case of Uganda: Some individuals were [wealthier] than others just as some were poorer than others. The wealthy never lost sight of their obligations to the kinship group just as the poor members of such a group were never slow in claiming their due from them. The point is that nobody could become wealthy without reference to his kinship group for this must have helped him in numerous ways, although his personal merits may contribute towards his success. In such societies, there had never been room for individualism or impersonal governorships requiring equally impersonal regulations to service them. This does not mean that all clan members accepted their status. In some pre-colonial societies, for example, women had very low or no place, and were regarded as objects to be bartered and exchanged. It is unlikely that women were broadly accepting of their inequality though, over time, many conformed. There were frequent inter clan wars, as families and kin either tried to expand or defend their territories. However, ethnic identities were notably fluid. Inter-clan marriages were common and those who were assimilated through war, trade or other methods either adopted the practices of the clans they joined or, in cases, were allowed to continue observing their own. As they intermingled, people learnt new languages, cookery and farming techniques; they also adopted other cultural practices. 3.2 Missionaries, Anthropologists and Colonialists There are a number of explanations for how these fluid identities subsequently degenerated into fixed boundaries: 'the mental maps and virtual checkpoints that delineate outsiders and insiders' (Migdal 2004). Historical accounts outline the disruptive roles of missionaries, anthropologists and colonialists. As they competed for souls, missionaries demarcated territorial boundaries where none existed and categorized people into groups, in many cases to which they did not belong. Anthropologists studied customs and described behaviour, differentiating between those who were more and less primitive, savage or acceptable. Eventually, some Africans accepted and projected these differentiations. Colonialists capitalised on existing and growing divisions, also demarcating and fixing territorial and, therewith, ethnic, religious and racial boundaries; implementing policies that stratified both racial and ethnic groups; promoting new hierarchies within groups; disrupting clan structures and relations, such that protective leaders became colonial agents, exacting taxes and tributes on behalf of the crown. Therefore, colonial administrators helped to distort the meanings and purpose of core cultural institutions. Further, they elevated some forms of identity (ethnicity, culture, religion, race) over the other multiple associations and identities that could have promoted commonalities rather than differences. 3.3 Post-Colonial Administrations and the Politicisation of Identity More recent explanations describe how post-colonial African leaders have politicised identities, largely to suit their own interests. In some countries, ethnic and cultural divisions were manufactured and managed in ways that culminated in more dislocation than in the colonial period (Vail, 1996:5). Divisions have resulted in conflict, particularly in contexts where leaders used econom ic and political resources to reward favoured 4

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groups at the expense of others, or to elevate select cultural practices and deny others. Like the colonialists, leaders have also used their power and position to fix intra and inter-group identities: demonstrating and manipulating 'symbols of community', such as religion, dress, language; inculcating 'certain values and norms of behaviour; (cited in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1984:1); using the past, including myths about group origin, to define---and confine---the present; using the past as the basis for group exclusion and inclusion, and to legitimise existing authority structures and hierarchical relations. These constructed traditions and imposed identities have generated and sustained social inequalities as groups and individuals come to believe in their ascribed superiority or inferiority. 3.4 Globalisation and Identity Politics Particularly since the 1980s, analysts have also highlighted the link between globalisation and the rise in identity politics. Sharp (1996:64) describes this upsurge as a defence mechanism against processes of capital accumulation, which constantly shift production sites in the search for profitability. For example, in the Namaqualand region of South Africa , coloured people worked in the copper and diamond mines from the Great Depression in the 1930s. By the 1970s, the area was no longer impoverished and people began to define themselves in different ways. While they did not forget that they were descendants of pre-colonial Namaqualand inhabitants, gradually, this history became less significant as people came to regard their 'coloured identity as a sign of modernity'. Since the 1980s, the mining industry has contracted, unemployment and insecurity levels have increased, and multinationals have begun to cut production in the area. In response, Namaqualand residents have reasserted their indigenous, Nama, identity in order to stake their claims to some of the land that the mining companies owned. However, not all groups have the leverage to contest. As Fraser (1997) shows, some groups, which are subject to both cultural devaluation and economic subordination, often lack the power to make claims and to re present their identities. Pastoral groups throughout much of Africa and various indigenous communities are often categorised, stigmatised and marginalized, and have little or no presence or influence in established policy making channels. 3.5 The Roles of Culture Despite these transitions and misuse of culture, recent surveys indicate that Africans still maintain a sense of pride in their countries, continent and ethnic origins, though there is a belief that traditional values and ties have 'weakened over time'. Further, 'there is a strong desire to preserve . ethnic traditions with 78% in Kenya to 95% in Malawi supporting this view'. (BBC Pulse of Africa Survey, 2004: 7) It is neither practicable nor prudent to ignore these views. First, cultural values , norms and allegiances (old and new) influence development . Second, people are now insisting on their cultural rights: there has been a transition from class-based agitation to other identity-based claims, particularly as people become disaffected with the quality of their political representation and form new cross-country ties through globalisation. This synopsis highlights a number of important issues: (a) Ethnicity and culture are natural and durable. (b) Inequalities, perceived and real, are often the root cause of identity conflicts. In such contexts, politicisation is especially effective. People are easily mobilised when they feel that their identity and positions are being/are likely to be threatened. (c) Ethnicity and culture have multiple---constructive and destructive---roles in development : they can harbour power structures and relations that fuel inter-group inequalities and conflict, sustain intra-group inequalities and infringement of fundamental rights, influence people's choices and actions, provide unconventional but effective spaces for engagem ent, offer useful and more appropriate methods and approaches to development . 5

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These issues are crucial for policy. A comprehensive cultural approach to development requires that policymakers design and implement policies that capitalize on the positive aspects of culture, while curbing the negative. This means tackling relations of power and ensuring that interventions do not trigger unintended social relations and new inequalities. Sen (2004) outlines key components of a culture- sensitive approach. Section 3 includes some of these components and notes key guidelines for policy. 4. P OLICY I MPLICATIONS 4.1 'C ULTURE AS A C ONSTITUTIVE P ART OF D EVELOPMENT ' According to Sen (2004:39), well-being does not merely depend on the per capita GNP; it requires the 'enrichment of human lives through cultural expression and practice'. Further, 'the freedom and opportunity for cultural activities are among the basic freedoms, the enhancement of which can be seen to be constitutive of development '. This supports the perspectives outlined in the Human Development Report 2004 that (a) cultural rights are fundamental to human rights and (b) cultural rights and recognition are important first steps in promoting a culturally sensitive approach to development . The significance and urgency of cultural rights and recognition are especially apparent where people are marginalized and stigmatized, such as in the case of some pastoralist and indigenous groups, discussed above. The Report outlines a variety of policy recommendations, including constitutional policies to guarantee fair representation of different cultural groups; language policies to ensure that all groups have access to education; redistributive policies to supply all groups with the necessary assets and opportunities. These policy recommendations draw on horizontal inequality theories, which recommend comprehensive redistribution and visible strategies for social and political inclusion so that people will be persuaded that they have fair prospects and the root causes of conflict will be abated. Such policies may be difficult to implement. Redistribution and new constitutional provisions can bring political costs. Further, constitutional change may be more appropriate and timely in some contexts than others. South Africa provides a good case study of how such group-based policies can be approached. It also provides evidence of their limitations: a concentration on access and opportunities may not address the deep power imbalances across groups. For example, some Tsonga-speakers (those classified as the 'Shangaan') in South Africa are still subject to discrimination at local and community levels, despite constitutional changes that support equal representation and access. These people carry all sorts of denigratory labels, and are in most circles regarded at the 'bottom of the social ladder'. Therefore, actual/substantive recognition may depend on policies that re -present people's histories and re -value the most marginalized groups, as well as far-reaching efforts to actively penalise discrimination. Further, lessons on tolerance, civicness and the value of all social and cultural groups could be included in education programmes, such that education becomes a mechanism for changing perceptions and social attitudes. However, policy-makers should be aware of some important qualifications to group rights and recognition. As Nussbaum explains: 1. Groups [can] contain hierarchies of power: thus giving legal privileges to a group is usually tantamount to giving more power to those already in power within the group. (This increased power can be used to legitimise individual repressions, such as where cultural authorities insist on retaining gender discrimination); 2. Groups have unclear and changing boundaries of membership; group rights often reify the current definition of a group and militate against change; 3. There are 'dispersed groups' that may be very important in people's identity, but that do not figure in the usual discussions of group ethno- cultural ri ghts.... Such groups are unlikely to win legal privileges but then, giving legal privileges to [recognised/mainstream] groups makes them more salient by contrast with the 'dispersed groups'. 6

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Therefore, group rights and recognition require more than a rational asset-based policy approach. They raise important relational and political questions that should guide policy approaches: 'In what ways and to what extent should we recognize groups? Whose identities does recognition celebrate, and with what consequences? Whose does it deny? In what ways can/does the focus on 'groups' produce unintended social consequences, and what are the implications for equity?' (Moncrieffe, forthcoming, 2006) 3.2. ' Cultural Factors Influence Economic , Political and Social Behaviour' Sen (2004:40) acknowledges that ' cultural influences can make a major difference to aspects of human behaviour, which can be critical to economic success'. (Therefore, it is not the case that 'all human beings behave in much the same way.relentlessly [maximising] their self interest'.) Sen does not regard these as fixed and irredeemable attributes but, instead, confirms that culture, which differs---often significantly--- within each country, affects how differing people view and use assets and opportunities and who gets access and how. These observations raise important policy issues, such as how differing cultures influence private sector development ; whether the private sector, with all its profit-maximizing self-interest assumptions, is appropriate in all contexts; whether there is need for culture-sensitive economic approaches, what these approaches might consist of and their advantages and disadvantages. Similarly, culture influences whether and how people participate in political activities, and the types of social and support associations that exist. These qualifications are important, since policy recommendations currently include participation and community, without sufficient consideration of how culture might affect these. For example, Golooba-Mutebi's study of local level participation in Rakai, Uganda notes the ways in which the powerful dominate proceedings, sometimes in a blatantly dis-empowering manner. Excerpts from speeches from the parish and sub county chiefs in one area record both officials accusing the villagers of laziness, irresponsibility and disrespect for those in authority. The sub county chief also warned 'of dire consequences' for those who reneged on their taxes. These examples do not merely point to the excesses of power; they are also the outgrowth of a culture of deference to the leader/big-man, which makes such excesses possible. The Afrobarometer report---which does not distinguish between rural and urban areas--- suggests that 'Ugandans may be caught between an authoritarian and paternalistic past and what is supposed to be a more participatory and accountable democracy. They want a government that is more accountable to them but they have not let go of a sense of dependency on government'. The survey finds that while Ugandans are interested in public affairs and believe that they have the right to question their leaders, 59% of respondents think that 'people are like children and the government should take care of them like a parent' Textbox 3.2 Traditions, Culture and Gender Inequality in Uganda Khadiagala (2001) states that one of the principal failures of popular democracy in Uganda is that though the National Resistance Movement promised that local councils would provide 'culturally appropriate forms of justice', which would benefit poor rural and uneducated women, local elites have used their positions to reinforce social control. Further, the gap between theory and practice arises out of misconceptions about the character of local spaces, particularly the notion of community.' Gender discrimination and inequality are rooted in some cultural norms and are fervently upheld, particularly in rural areas. This is one of the areas in which there is a strong and enduring conflict between culture and official policy, with serious consequences for citizenship and political development . Culture pervades government structures. Though PPA (Participatory Poverty Assessment 1) 1 corroborates current claims that LC1 officials are held in high regard, PPA2 reports that women were more critical than men. As far as many women were concerned, LC1 officials are biased against them, disregard their opinions and ignore women representatives. Additionally, there are allegations of corruption: In Wakiso, women report that men often pay LC1 officials to have complaints against them dismissed. 1 Gender discrimination persists despite structural reforms and claims of the right to custom perpetuate inequalities and abuse. (Source: Moncrieffe (2004:31-32), Uganda's Political Economy) 7

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As the discussion above and Textbox 3.2 show, social and political traditions can be both exclusive and inclusive, providing a buffer against poverty and inequality for some subgroups and individuals and entrenching inequalities for others. As noted, the dominant approaches to inequality and poverty concentrate on inequality as a condition, which is marked by differences in assets and opportunities. However, a relational approach that includes culture can help policymakers to understand the processes and power relations that underpin inequality. There are two important points: i. People may consciously and willingly uphold social and cultural customs that sustain a status quo, even an unequal status quo, but those whom outsiders regard as disadvantaged might place great value in the norms that hold these apparent 'inequalities' in place. For example, policymakers are normally confounded ii. Conversely, inter and intra-group power relations-- coercive and non-coercive; visible and hidden; agreed and imposed---can cause poverty and help to sustain inequalities (Moncrieffe, forthcoming, 2006) Appadurai (2004:59) notes that one important policy objective must be to build 'the capacity to aspire' among the most disadvantaged, such that people will regard themselves differently and 'find the resources required to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty'. He provides case examples of the long- term engagement that is required to change perceptions and aspirations among poor slum dwellers in Mumbai and challenges the short-term donor approach to development . The author outlines slowly evolving policies that utilize the knowledge of the slum dwellers themselves; and that gradually cultivates the desire and capacity to save, invest and, therefore, envision a future. Appadurai's accounts provide important lessons for building the capacity to aspire among those who appear to accept their own poverty. However, a comprehensive cultural approach must also focus on promoting behaviour change among the power- holders themselves. For example, programmes and policies for gender equality should go well beyond provide assets and opportunities for women and include medium and long strategies that focus on men. Jolly (2002) documents useful case studies. For example, FEMNET has been developing a long-term movement of men against gender violence. These advocates raise gender concerns in boys' social clubs, churches and political parties. Analysts recognise that men are more receptive to other male opinions. SPEECH is as NGO in Southern India that has established local non-formal community centres. The majority of staff are from the villages themselves. SPEECH engages in a long-term process of building trust and uses this foundation to teach conflict resolution and tackle gender discrimination. Women have reported that men have gradually changed their attitudes. The challenge is to find innovative ways of including projects such as these within sector programme, recognising that these are long-term processes, which may or may not lead to change. However, it is important to be cautious and reflective: policies for 'building cultural and social aspirations' can easily amount to an imposition of Western goals and values , which may culminate in cultural domination and new forms of inequality and poverty. 3.3 'Culture Influences Value Formation and Evolution' As the preceding discussions imply, culture 'can have a significant role in the formation of values '. Sen (42) concludes that 'this can be influential in the identification of our ends and the recognition of plausible and acceptable instruments to achieve those ends'. Culture, and the values it supports, should also figure significantly in policy design. As noted, policymakers could attempt to change values ---such as those supporting various forms of discrimination---through education programmes, starting from the earliest levels; through community discussions; and by men reaching out to men. UNESCO contends that a comprehensive approach to HIV/AIDS requires value transformation and has been designing and implementing policies to that end. 8

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Textbox 3.3: Transforming Values and Preventing HIV/AIDS 'The economic dependence and extensive illiteracy of women and girls results often in sexual dependence leading to abuse, sometimes incestuous, early pregnancy and marriage, and quite frequently also to forced prostitution. Often these situations are worsened by extreme poverty and linked to deeply rooted traditional value systems, especially in rural societies. Men's overemphasis on masculinity is linked to situations of extreme social and economic dependence. The way out of such situations is to integrate them to culturally appropriate education from an early age and thus enhance the development of a new urban culture, based on shared efforts to develop HIV/AIDS prevention and care and to improve their economic and social situation on the basis of a new culture adapted to the modern world' Source: Handbook for Culturally Appropriate Project Design, IEC, Capacity Building, Data Collection and Research UNESCO, November 1999 and .( http://www.unesco.org/culture/women/ ) 3.4 Culture, Democracy and Conflict In contrast with the view that African cultures are primarily tribal in nature, there is the perspective that culture can help to solve conflicts and promote democracy. Section 3.2 above provided examples of how inter and intra-group power structures and relations can hold inequalities in place. It is important to be mindful of such possibilities but to also recognise the traditions of kinship, conflict resolution and community that are still prevalent in Africa and through which clans still provide an important mode of social/ cultural censure for offending members. Often, these potential resources are excluded from formal policy. In addition, culture can provide avenues for healing and reconciliation. For example, after months of war in the Ivory Coast, cultural activities were organised, which focused on war, reconciliation and peace. These provided opportunities for children to express their feelings about the war through theatre and for young writers to compose books and poetry that serve as reminders of the costs of war and the merits of peace. 1 3.4 Cultural Activities and Objects Can Provide Economic Remuneration Recently, there has been much attention to the worth of cultural industries, particularly the development their promotion might bring to minority cultures. There are necessary qualifications. First, it is important that policymakers are sensitive to the sanctity of certain cultural products; cultural recognition entails awareness of objects and locations that will be compromised by commercial use. Second, without adequate protection and other special measures, there is no guarantee that minority cultures will have fair access to markets and/or that they will not be disadvantaged in the process. Therefore, policies for promoting cultural industries must be cognizant on the power structures and relations across groups and design interventions in ways that power relations can be transformed to profit the least advantaged. Changes in power relations may require special measures to re-present and revalue histories and customs that have been misrepresented and devalued. 3.5 There is Value in Cultural Knowledge and Ownership Organisations such as the UNESCO provide evidence of the benefits of including culture in policy design and implementation. For example, in 1998, UNESCO/UNAIDS launched a joint programme that was designed to foster a 'culturally-appropriate response to HIV/AIDs prevention and care'. The programme 1 http://www.powerofculture.nl/uk/current/2003/august/ivorycoast.html 9

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acknowledges that people's 'ways of life, value systems, traditions, beliefs, religions and fundamental human rights' should be included and prioritised in the design, implementation and monitoring of HIV/AIDS programmes and projects. Importantly, UNESCO/UNAIDS views this approach as 'an essential component in achieving in-depth and sustainable changes in peoplés behaviour'. UNESCO/UNAIDS reports that they have made effective use of i nteractive theatre, particularly among the youth. They have also included traditional and religious leaders, faith-based communities and healers. Cultural Knowledge and HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care "Strengthening Linkages Between Conventional Service Providers and Traditional and Religious Institutions in HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care " In Maputo, Mozambique, UNESCO/UNAIDS' Cultural Approach to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care programme focuses on building communication and collaboration between HIV/AIDS educators and service providers, traditional healers, rites of initiation practitioners and religious institutions. UNESCO/UNAIDS argue that traditional and religious institutions play important roles in young people's lives, though lack of cooperation often prevents effective engagement. Therefore, the organizations are committed to exposing each group to the beliefs, role and potential of the other and building a concerted social and cultural approach to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=20658&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html South Africa : Life Forces and Life Choices. Khomani San Action Research on HIV/AIDS Under the same ' Cultural Approach to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care' project, UNESCO/UNAIDS have been supporting the Khomani San Action Research on HIV/AIDS, through which the elders have used traditional knowledge, language, cultural beliefs and values to spread messages about HIV/AIDS prevention and care. This, UNESCO/UNAIDS acknowledges, is 'an excellent example of how indigenous knowledge can be linked to world knowledge and science.' http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15225&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html Africans continue to supply examples of how cultural awareness can prove beneficial in areas such as nutrition, agriculture, sustaining the environment and promoting community health. For example, there are a number of local groups in Kenya who are 'working to preserve, revive, discourage or adapt traditional practices in order to improve the health of their community'. Herbalists are providing training on the medicinal uses of plants; there are projects to teach people about the nutritional value of certain wild plants. In other parts, such as the central highlands of Kenya, where rural Agikuyu women traditionally wear the mukwa---a long leather or fiber head strap that is used to carry heavy loads----there are projects to teach villagers about the negative health consequences. Similarly, on the shores of Lake Victoria, where the Luo are facing very high HIV infection rates, activists are promoting cultural dialogue on between elders and the youth. 2 4. Conclusions For some time, the dominant rationalist discourse precluded serious policy focus on issues such as ethnicity and culture. Culture is now gaining place in development though there is no agreement on how it matters and what it means for policy. The first section of this paper compared rational choice and relational approaches to developmen t and outlined what their implications for issues of identity, ethnicity and culture. Section 2 assessed static and more fluid interpretations of culture and then focused on assessments of 2 http://depts.washington.edu/health/ 10

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African cultures, specifically. The section emphasized that policymakers both within and outside of Africa are fearful that open discussions of culture and ethnicity will provoke conflict. While this apprehension is not entirely unjustified, the paper suggests that it is important to understand and address the root causes of these conflicts, and to analyse the varied ways in which culture affects development , as well as the new development paths that culture might suggest. Section 3 provided a brief historical overview of the development and transition of ethnicity and culture in Africa , underlining some of the main causes of conflict---such as inequalities, perceived and real, and nation-state development approaches, which have forced homogeneity rather than acknowledge diversity. The section confirms that despite the transitions and corruption of ethnicity and culture, old and new cultures continue to influence development and are highly valued across African countries. Section 4 analysed policy issues, concentrating specifically on the importance of group rights and recognition, including the limitations of the group approach and the challenges to change; the ways in which a cultural approach to development can help policy makers to understand and address the processes and power relations that underpin inequality and poverty; culture and value formation; culture and its potential role in democracy and conflict; the role of cultural industries; and the significance of cultural knowledge and ownership. The section also emphasized the safeguards that are important for facilitating fluid and democratic associations and identities and for preventing the disadvantage of the most marginalized. One further qualification is important. A culture-sensitive approach to development can itself become deterministic if policymakers do not integrate culture with other factors that influence identities, such as class, occupation, gender, location and politics (Sen 2004). It is the intermingling of all these sources of identity that produces heterogeneity, fluidity and change. 11

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5. References Appadurai, A. 'The Capacity to Aspire' in Rao, V. and M. Walton eds.(2004) Culture and Public Action, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Barnes, B. (2000) Understanding Agency: Social theory and responsible action. London: Sage. BBC (2004) Pulse of Africa Survey Bourdieu (1990) The Logic of Practice , Stanford: Stanford University Press Douglas, M. 'Traditional Culture-Let's Hear No More About it' in Rao, V. and M. Walton eds.(2004) Culture and Public Action , Stanford: Stanford University Press. Escobar, 1995 Encountering Development : The Making and Unmaking of the Third World , New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Eyben, R. 2004 Political and Social Inequality: A Review, Sussex: Institute for Development Studies Fraser, N. Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition. New York: Routledge Golooba-Mutebi, (1999) F. 'Reassessing Participation in Uganda' Paper prepared for presentation at the Development Studies Institute's 10th Anniversary Conference on 'New Institutional Theory, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction'. September 7-8, 1999. Harrison, L.E. and S. Huntington, eds.2000, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress , New York: Basic Books Hobsbawm, T. and E. Ranger (1984) The Invention of Tradition , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Huntington, S. 'Culture Count' in Harrison, L.E. and S. Huntington, eds. (2000), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, New York: Basic Books Jolly, S (2002) Bridge Report: Gender and Cultural Change, Supporting Resources Collection, Institute of Development Studies . Karugire, S. R. (1980) A Political History of Ugand a Exeter, New Hampshire: Heinemann Educational Books Khadiagala, L.S., (2001) 'The failure of popular justice in Uganda: local councils and women's property rights' Development and Change, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 55-76. Landes, D.S, 'Culture Makes Almost All the Difference' in Harrison, L.E. and S. Huntington, eds. (2000), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, New York: Basic Books Mare, G. (1993) Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa , Zed Books Migdal, J. ed. (2004), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12

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Moncrieffe, J. (2006) 'Beyond Categories: Power, Recognition and the Conditions for Agency', Background Paper for the World Development Report 2006. Nussbaum, M. (2003) The complexity of groups: A comment on Jorge Valadez Philosophy & Social Criticism 29: 57-69 Rao, V. and M. Walton eds.(2004) Culture and Public Action , Stanford: Stanford University Press. Sen (2004) 'How Does Culture Matter? In Rao, V. and M. Walton eds.(2004) Culture and Public Action , Stanford: Stanford University Press. Sharp, J. (1999) 'Culture, identity and nation in South Africa ' in ed. G. Maharaj, Between Unity and Diversity: Essays on Nation-building in Post-Apartheid South Africa , Idasa: David Philip Publishers. UNDP: Human Development Report 2004 Vail, L. Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History in ed. Vail, L. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa , London: James Currey, 1989 13